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SPYING INC.
Danielle Keats Citron∗
The latest spying craze is the “stalking app.” Once installed on someone’s cell phone,
the stalking app can provide continuous access to the person’s calls, texts, snap chats,
photos, calendar updates, and movements. Stalking apps destroy the privacy and
confidentiality of cell phone activities. Domestic abusers and stalkers frequently turn to
stalking apps because they are undetectable even to sophisticated phone owners.
Business is booming for stalking app providers, even though their entire enterprise is
arguably illegal. Federal and state wiretapping laws ban the manufacture, sale, or
advertisement of devices knowing their design makes them primarily useful for the
surreptitious interception of electronic communications. But those laws are rarely, if
ever, enforced. Existing law may be too restrictive to make a real difference.
A legal agenda is essential to combating the growth of stalking software. We need to update
criminal and civil penalties facing providers. Record-keeping requirements could help
decrease the demand for spyware. Private rights of action, if recognized, could help secure
redress and deterrence. To increase the likelihood that the law will be enforced, states and
localities need more training and digital forensic expertise. The private sector could
reinforce these efforts by offering devices that can prevent the installation of spyware.

INTRODUCTION
Private spying is a booming business. A rapidly growing sector of the
spying economy involves the provision of spyware, a type of malware installed
on someone’s device without knowledge or consent. Spyware providers earn
monthly fees for providing secret, real-time access to a networked device
owner’s communications and activities. 1
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Public Radio, September 15, 2014.
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The “stalking app” is the private spy’s current tool of choice. 2 Search
“cell phone spy” and an array of advertisements appear. 3 “Worried about your
spouse cheating? Track EVERY text, EVERY call and EVERY move they make
using our EASY Cell Phone Spy Software,” explained one provider. 4
The privacy invasions enabled by surveillance software are breathtaking.
Some stalking apps are devoted to tracking a phone owner’s geolocation data—
the street and city where a phone is present. 5 Geolocation data tells us far more
than points on a map. In her concurrence in United States v. Jones, Justice Sonia
Sotomayor warned that monitoring a person’s public movements “reflects a
wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations.” 6
Other stalking apps offer an even more revealing picture of someone’s
daily activities. With these apps, subscribers can monitor everything phone
owners do with their phones. In real time, subscribers can listen to a phone
owner’s calls and video chats; they can view their texts, photos, calendars,
contacts, and browsing habits. 7 Targeted phones can be turned into bugging
devices; conversations within a fifteen-foot radius of a phone are recorded and
uploaded to the provider’s portal. As FlexiSpy tells subscribers, “Bug their
room: listen in on their phone’s surroundings and listen in on what is really
going on behind closed doors.” 8
A key selling point of stalking apps is their stealth nature. 9 Subscribers
are assured that once they download the spyware app to someone’s phone, the

Cahal Milmo, Exclusive: Abusers Using Spyware Apps to Monitor Partners Reaches ‘Epidemic
Proportions,’ INDEPENDENT (U.K.) (Dec. 26, 2014),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/exclusive-abusers-using-spywareapps-to-monitor-partners-reaches-epidemic-proportions-9945881.html.
3 See Appendix, Exhibit A.
4 Location Privacy Protection Act of 2014: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Privacy, Technology and
the Law of the S. Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (June 4, 2014), Testimony of the Cindy
Southworth, Vice Pres. of the National Network to End Domestic Violence on behalf of the
Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women, available at
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/06-04-14SouthworthTestimony.pdf
[hereinafter Southworth Testimony].
5 Id.
6 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
7 Saiyai Sakawee, This App Lets Men with “Several Girlfriends” Spy on Their Significant Others’
Every Move, TECH IN ASIA (Dec. 11, 2013), https://www.techinasia.com/app-lets-men-severalgirlfriends-spy-significant-others-move/.
8
http://www.flexispy.com.
9 Id.
2
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phone owner will be unable to detect the spyware. 10 Stalking apps are
advertised as “100% undetectable.” 11 FlexiSPY promises “total control of your
partner’s phone without them knowing it. . . See exactly where they are, or
were, at any given date or time.” 12 Cellphone Spying stresses: “What this
app . . . can do is capture that information for retrieval at a later date—without
the target phone user ever knowing anything about it! As with all its
functionality, the user of the targeted phone will have no clue that their phone
has been compromised or that their data is getting leaked to somebody else.” 13
HelloSpy claims that its app “silently monitor[s] text messages, GPS locations,
call details, photos, and social media activity.” Users are assured that the app
“does not display any icons and appears on the device application database
under different names (system processes), which leaves virtually no chance for
the user to identify this software.” 14
Cyber stalking apps and their ilk thus enable continuous and secret
tracking of a cell phone owner’s intimate conversations, medical appointments,
online banking activity, intellectual musings, minute-to-minute movements,
and far more. As the Court underscored in California v. Riley, with access to
someone’s cell phone, a viewer can reconstruct the “sum of an individual’s
private life.” 15
Although providers often emphasize that parents and employers could
use their apps to check on children and employees, stalkers and domestic
abusers are their targeted audience. 16 National Network to End Domestic
Violence’s Vice President Cindy Southworth explains that, “some developers
try to mask their nefarious intentions by mentioning child safety or employee
safety once or twice, but their true focus is obvious when they reiterate on
every page how their products are completely hidden and work in stealth
mode.” 17
mSpyVIP, Cell Phone Spy – mSpy Review, YOUTUBE (Dec. 15, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YNbT0At4Tsg.
11 Southworth Testimony, supra note.
12 Location Privacy Protection Act of 2014: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Privacy, Technology and
the Law of the S. Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (June 4, 2014), Opening Statement of Chairman
Franken, available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/06-0414FrankenStatement.pdf.
13 How Do Cell Spying Apps Work?, CELLSPYINGHQ (Jan. 15, 2014),
http://cellspyinghq.com/how-do-cell-spying-programs-work/.
14 Southworth Testimony, supra note, at 19.
15 California v. Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014).
16 See Appendix, Exhibit B.
17 Press Release, National Network to End Domestic Violence, Senate Bill Would Ban Stalking
Apps and Save Women’s Lives (June 4, 2014), http://nnedv.org/news/4296-senate-bill-wouldban-stalking-apps-and-save-women-s-lives.html.
10
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If one digs at all, it becomes clear that stealth surveillance of ex-intimates
is a key goal.18 Stalking apps are hailed as the “spy in [a cheating spouse’s]
pocket.“ 19 FlexiSPY advertisements prominently feature a photo of a couple
next to the message: “many spouses cheat. They all use cell phones. Their
phones will tell you what they won’t.” 20 The advertisement continues,
“Women who do cheat usually do so in a well-planned and discrete [sic]
fashion, making it exceedingly difficult for their man to know they’re being
cuckolded. . . . Women are much more capable of looking you straight in the
eye and lying.” 21 A marketing video for a stalking app asked, “So you want to
keep an eye on your loved one or your employees, because you suspect they’re
hiding something and it might get too late?” 22 Another app provider’s
advertisement includes “a photo of a woman whose face was marked with ugly
abrasions and whose forearm was held in the grip of a man.” 23 mSpy
emphasizes that its software app helps people catch cheating wives. 24
Much of this activity is illegal. Intercepting electronic communications
without at least one party’s consent violates federal and state wiretap laws. In
most states and at the federal level, cyber stalking is a crime. 25 But bringing
criminal law to bear against individual perpetrators is challenging. Spyware
apps are hard to detect; so then is the criminal surveillance.
Even when stalking victims suspect that their phones are being
monitored, their complaints to law enforcement are seldom pursued. Police
departments often lack the forensic equipment necessary to examine mobile
Cellphone Spying, a site about stealth spying on intimates, links to PhoneWatcher.net, which
in turn links to the spyware provider mSpy. mSpy says that 40% of users are parents and 10 to
15% are small businesses monitoring employees but is silent about the remaining 45 to 50% of
its customers. Kate Knibbs, Smartphone Spying Startup Will Keep an Eye on NYC, DAILY DOT (Feb.
27, 2014), http://www.dailydot.com/technology/mspy-goes-to-nyc/. In March 2014, mSpy’s
website demonstrated the service with a man tracking the communications and whereabouts of
his wife and son. E.J. Dickson, To Catch a Cheater: 6 Apps for Spying on Your Significant Other,
DAILY DOT (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.dailydot.com/technology/love-surveillance-spyingapps/.
19 Id.
20 FlexiSpy, http://www.flexispy.com. Under the caption “Catch Cheaters,” Flexispy asks, “Is
your wife or husband cheating on you? For the sake of your mental and sexual health, you
have a right to know if your partner is being responsible. Spy on their cellphones to know.”
21 Milmo, supra note.
22 Stealth Genie Official, StealthGenie - World's Most Powerful Cell Phone Spy Software, YOUTUBE
(July 31, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YycVKHOCp0M&list=UUi2qZEeLu4x7eH70o52njQ
23 Kim Zetter, The Criminal Indictment that Could Finally Hit Spyware Makers Hard, WIRED (Oct. 1,
2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/10/stealthgenie-indictment/.
24 mSpyVIP, supra note.
25 D ANIELLE K EATS C ITRON , H ATE C RIMES IN CYBERSPACE 123-25 (2014).
18

4

Forthcoming Volume 72:3 of the WASHINGTON & LEE LAW REVIEW (2015)

devices for stalking apps. 26 Reports often go nowhere because domestic
violence and stalking are low priorities for law enforcement. Police officers
receive little training on the relevant laws and the technology necessary to
investigate such crimes. 27 Because both the law and the technology are not well
understood, law enforcement does little beyond advising victims to get rid of
their phones. Resources to fund digital forensic investigations are especially
scarce at the state and local level. Then too, the lack of cooperation between
jurisdictions may prevent the apprehension of stalkers.
What about the parties responsible for providing spyware and other
covert surveillance tools? Under federal law, it is a crime to manufacture, sell,
or advertise a device knowing or having reason to know that the design of the
device renders it “primarily useful” for the covert interception of electronic,
wire, or oral communications. Twenty-five states and the District of Columbia
have similar criminal statutes. At least in theory then, the providers of stalking
apps could face federal and state criminal charges if it can be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the apps are “primarily useful” for secret surveillance.
The prosecution of businesses involved in the manufacture and sale of
stalking apps could be a crucial deterrent, but that possibility has not yet been
realized. There have been few, if any, state prosecutions against the entities
providing covert surveillance tools and a modest number at the federal level. If
law enforcement initiated more investigations, the law may only cover a
narrow set of devices or tools: those whose design renders them “primarily
useful” for the interception of electronic, wire, or oral communications.
Existing law does not ban the interception of location data.
Although the Federal Trade Commission has brought a handful of
enforcement actions against spyware providers for engaging in unfair and
deceptive trade practices, stalking app providers have paid little attention.
Such services continue to proliferate; their ads brazenly appear online.

Location Privacy Protection Act of 2014: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Privacy, Technology and
the Law of the S. Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (June 4, 2014), Testimony of Detective Brian Hill,
Criminal Investigations Division, Anoka County Sheriff’s Office, available at
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/06-04-14HillTestimony.pdf [hereinafter
Hill Testimony].
27 D ANIELLE K EATS C ITRON , H ATE C RIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014). The Attorney General of
California Kamala Harris has been working hard to address this problem in her state. I’m
working with her Task Force on Cyber Exploitation on efforts to educate law enforcement
about cyber stalking. Funds are being diverted to enhance law enforcement’s digital forensic
expertise in California. Telephone Interview with Special Attorney General Jeffrey Rabkin
(notes on file with author).
26
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Something more must be done. Software secretly tracking a phone’s
activities exacts profound costs to privacy while serving no legitimate purpose.
Aided by spyware, abusers can find victims who are desperately trying to
escape them. Victims of domestic abuse have been beaten and killed. When
victims learn that their phones are the source of their vulnerability, the
emotional fallout is profound. Stalking victims lose their sense of personal
safety. They experience anxiety at the thought of being under surveillance by
their stalkers. New phones must be purchased and time spent devising new
passwords and accounts. 28 Many victims lack the resources to purchase new
phones. If an abuser tracks a domestic violence victim to a shelter, other victims
staying at the shelter are at risk, now and in the future. 29
Domestic abusers and stalkers are increasingly turning to surveillance
software to terrorize victims. A Bureau of Justice Statistics study conducted in
2006 estimated that 25,000 people are stalked via GPS annually. 30 That number
surely understates the problem given the increasing adoption of cell phones
and availability of stalking apps. 31 According to a 2012 survey of 750 victim
services agencies, 75% of domestic violence survivors experience tracking of
their location through their cell phones or a GPS device. 32 A 2014 study
sponsored by Digital Trust found that more than 50 percent of abusive partners
used spyware or some other form of electronic surveillance to stalk victims. 33
The overall number of stalking victims is significant and growing: in 2009, the
Bureau of Justice Statistics estimated that over 3.4 million individuals are
stalked annually; 34 in 2014, the Department of Justice’s Bea Hanson testified
that 6.6 million people are stalked annually. 35
Despite the dangers, surveillance software remains widely available for
purchase by domestic abusers and stalkers. The risks of stalking apps will only
escalate over time as our smartphones are connected to even more revealing
information, such as biometric measuring devices and home appliances.
Hill Testimony, supra note, at XX.
Much thanks to Rachel Levinson-Waldman for her expertise and insights on these matters.
30 Katrina Baum, Shanna Catalano, Michael Rand, and Kristina Rose, Stalking Victimization in
the United States, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report No. NCJ 224527 (January 9, 2009),
8.
31 The Department of Justice may no longer be a resource for data about GPS stalking.
Unfortunately, the Bureau of Justice Statistics survey has eliminated inquiry into the prevalence
of GPS stalking.
32 Southworth Testimony, supra note, at XX.
33 Milmo, supra note.
34 Baum, supra note, at 8.
35 Location Privacy Protection Act of 2014: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Privacy, Technology and
the Law of the S. Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (June 4, 2014), Testimony of Bea Hanson, Principal
Deputy Dir., Department of Justice Office of Violence Against Women, available at
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/06-04-14HansonTestimony.pdf.
28
29
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This essay proposes a legal agenda aimed to curtail the enablers of
private spies—the businesses manufacturing, selling, or advertising spyware
and other stealth surveillance equipment. Given the difficulty of finding
stalkers due to the surreptitious nature of surveillance tools, the producers of
such software are a crucial source of punishment and deterrence. The question
is how might we improve the law, its enforcement, and other non-legal efforts?
A legal agenda should include legal reforms. Current criminal law may
be too restrictive to combat the stalking app industry. The provision of devices
secretly collecting location data should be banned. Also, criminal law should
extend to the purveyors of devices whose design renders them “useful” for
secret surveillance. Another potential reform is to require app providers to
collect records on subscribers so that private spies can be found and caught. On
the civil side, individuals should be given a private right of action against the
purveyors of cyber stalking software.
Legal reform should be paired with efforts to enhance law’s enforcement.
More resources should be dedicated to training law enforcement and to digital
forensic expertise. Criminal law has no chance of serving as a deterrent if it is
never pursued. State consumer protection agencies bring enforcement actions
against spyware providers.
To be clear about this paper’s scope, this essay does not address
government surveillance. In a series of articles, David Gray and I have explored
government’s mass data collection, analysis, and sharing. 36 We have proposed
a right to quantitative privacy to strike a better balance between individual and
collective expectations of privacy and law enforcement’s interest in preventing,
detecting, and prosecuting terrorism and crimes. This essay leaves aside the
collection, use, and sharing of personal data for legitimate commercial ends,
which I have explored in other work. 37
David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62 (2013);
David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic
Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 381 (2013); David Gray, Danielle Keats
Citron & Liz Clark Rinehart, Fighting Cybercrime After United States v. Jones, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 745 (2013); Danielle Keats Citron & David Gray, Addressing the Harm of Total
Surveillance: A Reply to Professor Neil Richards, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 262 (2013). See also Danielle
Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic Surveillance State, HASTINGS
L.J. (2011).
37 Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society, W ASH . L. REV. (2014); Danielle
Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1805 (2011); Danielle Keats Citron, The
Privacy Implications of Deep Packet Inspection, in DEEP PACKET INSPECTION: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS
BY INDUSTRY EXPERTS (Office of the Privacy Comm’r of Can. 2009), available at
https://www.priv.gc.ca/information/research-recherche/2009/keats-citron_200903_e.asp;
36
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Part I sets the stage with a brief history of the industry involved in the
secret surveillance of individuals’ confidential communications. It discusses the
development of tools facilitating the continuous, indiscriminate, and secret
surveillance of individuals for private, criminal ends. Part II asks what current
law does about the production of surveillance tools. It explores the gaps in
legal protections and the under-enforcement of existing law. Part III offers a
legal agenda to combat the problem of private spying. It calls for an expansion
of criminal and civil law and for more training and resources to ensure the
enforcement of existing laws. It wraps up by addressing potential non-legal
strategies.
I.

THE PRIVATE SURVEILLANCE BUSINESS

A. Evolution of the Spying Trade
Human beings are inherently curious. Gossip has long been a common
pastime. 38 Predictably then, as soon as telegraphs and telephones became
available for purchase, so did devices designed to intercept confidential
telephone and telegraph communications. 39 In the early 1900s, telephone
wiretap devices were widely advertised and sold. 40 Businesses and individuals
bought them to spy on competitors, employees, and spouses. 41
Over time, spying tools grew in variety and sophistication. 42 In the 1940s
and 1950s, mail order catalogs sold location trackers, spy cameras, bugging
devices, radio pills, and tiny tape recorders.43 Available for purchase were
bugging devices hidden in martini olives, suitcase handles, earrings, and tie
clasps. Miniature bugging devices could broadcast conversations to a receiver a
block away. 44 Parabolic microphones could pick up voices without being
placed on the premises. 45 Catalogs sought to avoid entanglement with the law
Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the
Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (2007).
38 D ANIEL J. S OLOVE , THE F UTURE OF REPUTATION : G OSSIP, RUMOR , AND P RIVACY ON THE
INTERNET (2007).
39 S AMUEL D ASH , T HE I NTRUDERS : UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND S EIZURES FROM K ING J OHN
TO J OHN A SHCROFT 79 (2004). During the Civil War, military telegraph messages were
routinely intercepted. Id. After the war’s end, telegraph operators got into the private
wiretapping business. Id.
40 Alan F. Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative Solution, 52 COLUM. L.
REV. 165, 168 (1957).
41 Id.
42 DASH, supra note, at 85; see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 47 (1967).
43 A LAN W ESTIN , P RIVACY AND F REEDOM 90, 98 (1967).
44 M YRON BRENTON , T HE P RIVACY INVADERS 152 (1964).
45 Berger, 388 U.S. at 47.
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by warning buyers to use bugging tools “according to the laws of your
community.” 46
The low cost of spying devices fueled their widespread adoption. 47
Businesses installed microphones in the walls of employee restrooms and
desks. 48 Model homes and car salesrooms were equipped with hidden bugs to
allow salespeople to overhear the musings of prospective buyers.49 Husbands
bugged their wives’ bedrooms and wiretapped their home phones, and wives
wiretapped and bugged their husbands’ offices. 50
Early bugging devices faced objections and legal restrictions. As the next
Part explores, states and Congress barred nonconsensual wiretapping, but the
laws were limited in their reach and hardly ever enforced.
B. Private Spying 2.0
The martini listening device, telephone bug, and parabolic microphone
are quaint by modern standards. Today’s spying tools can provide a totalizing
picture of someone’s daily activities, from the sacred to the quotidian. In a
dragnet style, they produce a continuous record of a person’s movements,
communications, online browsing, reading habits, searches, snap chats, videos,
and more. Thanks to falling storage costs, it is cheap to preserve a continuous
record of our intellectual, economic, political, social, and physical pursuits.
Cell phones are gold mines for the spying business. Stalking apps
generate a precise, comprehensive record of a cell phone owner’s activities,
communications, and location in real time. Every time a person’s phone
generates media content, the content is uploaded to the spyware subscriber’s
account for remote viewing. Through a web portal, users can view the person’s
calendar entries, Facebook posts, address book, photos, videos, online activities,
text messages, call logs, emails, snap chats, and location. The watcher can turn
the person’s phone into a bugging device and pick up their conversations. 51
Cell phone owners will have no reason to suspect the surveillance because
spyware is designed to be undetectable. 52

BRENTON, supra note, at 155.
To the tune of $250. Id. at 153.
48 DASH, supra note, at 84.
49 Id. at 85.
50 Id.
51 Knibbs, supra note.
52 United States’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 4,
United States v. Hammad Akbar, Civil No. 1:14 CV 1273 (E.D. Va. Oct. 2, 2014).
46
47
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In the near future, far more information will be linked to mobile
personal devices. Already on the market are fitness exercise bands that link to
our phones, tracking our heart rate and exercise. Soon, cell phones will be
connected to our home appliances, alarms, and more.
We have some sense of the businesses involved in spyware. 53 Let’s
consider a few examples. mSpy, a UK company with a New York office, sells a
mobile app that facilitates the stealth monitoring of a person’s phone activity.
According to mSpy, 74% of its users are male. The most active users are
between 35 to 44 years old, and 53% live in the United States. Texans and
Californians drive the most traffic to mSpy’s website. 54 mSpy says that parents
make up 40% of its users and that employers constitute 10 to 15% of its user
base. mSpy has said nothing about the remaining 45 or 50% of its customers. In
March 2014, mSpy’s website demonstrated the service with a man tracking the
communications and whereabouts of his wife and son. 55
Highster Mobile allows users to “secretly track and spy on virtually any
cell phone quickly and easily completely undetected.” 56 On YouTube, a
Highster subscriber hailed the spyware for helping him catch his wife cheating.
“Without this software, I would not have been able to know that my suspicions
about her cheating was correct.” 57 A Highster-sponsored user review page
included several reviews applauding the app’s utility in stalking intimates. One
person wrote, “It doesn’t work very well, but i did receive enough text
messages to know she is cheating on me, not with 1 guy but 3, what a
woman!!” 58 Still another said, “Highster Mobile literally changed my life after I
found my suspicions were correct. I’m now living in a different country and
having the time of my life. I am free!!!” 59 YouTube users reviewing the app said
it is great to use to watch your “cheating spouse” or your kids. 60

53 Just to name just a few: iSpyoo, SpyBubble, Highster, mSpy, Cell Phone Spy, and Spy to
Mobile. Leah Wightley, Highster Mobile Review, YOUTUBE (Aug. 19, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O2Bs5ABMRoA.
54 Molly Mulshine, Watch What You Text: iPhone Surveillance Startup Moves to NYC, BETABEAT
(Feb. 26, 2014), http://betabeat.com/2014/02/watch-what-you-text-iphone-surveillancestartup-moves-to-nyc/.
55 Dickson, supra note.
56 Remote Cell Phone Tracker and Spy, HIGHSTER MOBILE, http://www.highstermobi.com (last
visited Jan. 21, 2015).
57 louiseramirez88, Best Cell Phone Spying Tool, How I Find Out that my Wife was CHEATING!!,
YOUTUBE (Feb. 9, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X0CIhdDbChY.
58 Highster Mobile Reviews, TOP 10 SPY SOFTWARE REVIEW,
http://www.top10spysoftware.com/review/highstermobile.
59 Id.
60 Highster Mobile Review, Highster Mobile 3: What You Need to Know Before You Buy Highster
Mobile, YOUTUBE (Jan. 29, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aUvvVx06iLw.
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C. Perils of Spyware
Spyware apps enable stalkers and domestic abusers to terrorize victims.
Physical harm is a serious peril when abusers have access to victims’ activities
and whereabouts. A woman fled her abuser who was living in Kansas. 61
Because her abuser had installed a cyber stalking app on her phone, her abuser
knew that she had moved to Elgin, Illinois. He tracked her to a shelter and then
a friend’s home where he assaulted her and tried to strangle her. 62 In another
case, a woman tried to escape her abusive husband, but because he had
installed a stalking app on her phone, he was able to track down her and her
children. The man murdered his two children. 63 In 2013, a California man,
using a spyware app, tracked a woman to her friend’s house and assaulted
her. 64
In addition to the serious physical risks posed by abusers’ access to
spyware, imagine the chilling of expression and anxiety that ensues when
stalking victims discover that their mobile devices have been providing their
abuser with total access to every communication, search conducted, photo
taken, book read on a reading app, snapchat shared, social network message
received, activity on dating apps, and step taken—for days, weeks, and
months. Victims have told law enforcement that they no longer feel
comfortable using their phones for fear that their abuser has somehow
reinstalled spyware on their phones. They can become paranoid about using
networked technologies for work, socializing, and public conversations, lest
their abuser track them down. They experience distress about being watched. 65
That sort of chilling implicates our intellectual privacy. 66 Once
individuals become aware that their communications have been under
surveillance, they may internalize the notion of being listened to and watched.
Individual development is inevitably chilled in the face of unwanted
monitoring.
Franken Statement, supra note, at 2.
Id.
63 Id.
64 Southworth Testimony, supra note, at 12.
65 Studies have shown that people experience anxiety about being watched and misunderstood.
Stuart A. Karabenick & John R. Knapp, Effects of Computer Privacy on Help-Seeking, 18 J. APPLIED.
SOC. PSYCHOL. 461 (1988).
66 N EIL M. RICHARDS , I NTELLECTUAL P RIVACY : RETHINKING C IVIL L IBERTIES IN THE D IGITAL
AGE (forthcoming 2015); J ULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE,
AND THE PLAY OF E VERYDAY L IFE 141 (2012); Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126
HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013); Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008); Julie
E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373,
1425-26 (2000).
61
62
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Stalking apps can be used to facilitate financial crimes. For instance, they
can be used to steal sensitive personal information like social security numbers
and passwords to assist in identity theft. Secretly installed spyware provides
users access to a victim’s bank passwords that can be used to empty accounts. 67
If victims lose their financial cushion, the harm that they experience will be far
worse and their options more limited. 68
II.

LAW’ S ROLE COMBATING SPYING INC.

“Few threats to liberty exist . . . greater than that posed by . . . eavesdropping
devices.” 69

Congress and half of the states have adopted bans on the business side
of illegal eavesdropping, but the enforcement of those laws has been lackluster.
This Part begins by laying out some key developments in wiretapping law.
Then, it highlights federal and state prohibitions on the manufacture, sale, and
advertisement of certain surveillance devices. The enforcement of those laws
and their limits are explored. This Part ends by discussing the role that
consumer protection agencies have begun to play in curtailing the production
of spyware.
A. Historical Development of Wiretapping Laws
In the mid-nineteenth century, a handful of states banned surreptitious
wiretapping of telegraph communications. California passed the first criminal
prohibition in 1862. 70 Telegraph wiretapping bans were soon extended to
include wiretaps on telephones. 71
The Supreme Court heard its first wiretapping case in 1928. In Olmstead
v. United States, Chief Justice Taft, writing for the majority, ruled that
government interception of private telephone communications did not
implicate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and
seizures. 72 The Court reasoned that “projected voices” did not constitute
“actual physical invasions” of the home warranting Fourth Amendment
Preliminary Injunctive Order, Federal Trade Commission v. CyberSpy Software LLC, and
Tracer R. Spence, No. 08-CV-01872 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/11/081128cyberspypi.pdf.
68 Southworth Testimony, supra note, at 15.
69 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63 (1967).
70 Id. at 45-46.
71 Berger, 388 U.S. at 45-46. California extended its prohibition of telegraph wiretapping to
telephone wiretapping in 1905. DASH, supra note, at 81.
72 Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
67
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protection. Because government agents cut into defendant’s telephone wires
outside his home and had not trespassed inside it, no Fourth Amendment
violation had occurred, the Court held. That federal law enforcement had
violated state wiretapping law was irrelevant.
As the Court noted in Olmstead, Congress could ban warrantless
wiretaps to fill in the gaps left by the Constitution. 73 Federal lawmakers did just
that in the Federal Communications Act of 1934. Section 605 of the
Communications Act banned the interception of radio or wire communications
and the disclosure of the content of such communications absent the consent of
one of the parties. The use of devices to secretly record face-to-face
communications in private places was not banned. 74
As a practical matter, the Communications Act offered scant protection
against wiretapping. The Department of Justice interpreted Section 605 to mean
that law enforcement could engage in wiretapping if it did not divulge material
obtained via wiretaps to others. 75 Because that interpretation was backed by
judicial decisions, law enforcement regularly used wiretapping equipment in
investigations. Private parties rarely faced prosecution under either federal or
state law because it seemed difficult to justify criminal charges against
individuals when law enforcement engaged in the same activity. 76
In 1967, two Supreme Court decisions—Katz v. United States 77 and Berger
v. New York 78—changed the trajectory of electronic surveillance law. In those
cases, the Supreme Court overturned Olmstead, ruling that electronic
surveillance constituted a search and seizure governed by the Fourth
Amendment. Under Katz, surveillance focused on the interception of a few
conversations was constitutionally acceptable if the interception was approved
277 U.S. at 465. Justice Brandeis wrote a powerful dissent that took the majority to task for
linking Fourth Amendment protection to outmoded property rights. Id. at 473-74 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). A property-based approach failed to protect citizens from procedures that might
not require the “force and violence” necessary to invade property, but nonetheless
compromised the sanctity of citizens’ thoughts, beliefs, emotions as well as the “individual
security” they invested in activities like telephone conversations. Id. at 473-74, 478-79. As Justice
Brandeis underscored, telephone communications are more private and confidential than
tangible objects in the home. Compared to telephone wiretaps, general warrants and writs of
assistance were “but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression.” Fourth Amendment
understandings needed to evolve to address scientific advances that permitted government
agents to invade our most private and intimate information without physically intruding on
the home.
74 DASH, supra note, at 83.
75 Westin, supra note, at 177.
76 Westin, supra note, at 179, 186.
77 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
78 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
73
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by a judge and based on a special showing of need. 79 By contrast, lengthy,
continuous, and indiscriminate electronic surveillance violated the Fourth
Amendment. 80
Katz involved an investigation of a man allegedly running an illegal
betting operation. Agents listened to the man’s calls by attaching a suction
microphone to a telephone booth’s roof. Katz was convicted based on evidence
gathered by the microphone. The Court held that using a listening device to
monitor telephone conversations in a public phone booth constituted a Fourth
Amendment “search.” In rejecting the trespass requirement, the Court declared
that, “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” 81 The Court found
that conversations in telephone booths deserve Fourth Amendment protection
because citizens expect that their telephone conversations are just as secure
from public review as their daily routines in the home. 82 The Court noted that
phone booths function as spaces of aural repose. 83 Citizens could reasonably
expect that their conversations in telephone booths would not be monitored by
“uninvited ear[s],” even if they can be seen by “intruding eye[s].” Declining to
extend Fourth Amendment protection would unsettle these broadly held
expectations and raise the specter of a surveillance state. 84 In Berger, the Court
made clear that “the fantastic advances in the field of electronic communication
constitute a great danger to the privacy of the individual.” 85 The Court held
that wiretapping statutes needed to include special privacy protections for
governmental monitoring to pass constitutional muster because the
indiscriminate nature of electronic surveillance devices was reminiscent of the
reviled general warrant. 86
In the shadow of Berger and Katz, Congress passed the Title III Wiretap
Act of 1968 and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986. 87
Title III laid out a regime of protections “to compensate for the uniquely
79 James X. Dempsey, Communications Privacy in the Digital Age: Revitalizing the Federal Wiretap
Laws to Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 65 (1997).
80 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
81 389 U.S. at 351.
82 Id. at 351-52.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 354-59.
85 Berger, 388 U.S. at 64.
86 Berger, 388 U.S. at 47 (ruling wiretapping raised special Fourth Amendment concerns because
it involved continuous intrusions, searches, and seizures and the indiscriminate monitoring of
communications over a period of time without connection to the crime under investigation
unlike the limited intrusion of a traditional search).
87 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197. The
Electronic Communications Privacy Act extended the Title III’s protections to wireless voice
communications and voice communications of a non-voice nature, such as e-mail or other
computer-to-computer transmissions.
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intrusive aspects of electronic surveillance.” 88 Law enforcement had to meet
stringent warrant requirements to intercept telephone calls over the wires. Law
enforcement could obtain wiretap orders only on a showing of special need, a
predicate felony offense, and high-level Justice Department or state approval. 89
Wiretap orders had to be narrowly tailored and time limited. 90 Officers had to
“minimize” the interception of innocent conversations. 91 Such minimization
was deemed essential to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s particularity
requirement, making up for the fact that law enforcement was getting access to
all of the target’s communications including those unconnected to the crime
under investigation.92 Wiretaps falling short of these requirements were
banned. 93
B. Cutting Off the Source: Section 2512 and Analogous State Statutes
Private individuals engaged in secret wiretapping could face criminal
charges. Under Title III, it is a felony to intercept electronic communications
unless one of the parties to a communication consented to the interception. 94 In
passing Title III, federal lawmakers recognized that private spies would be
difficult to identify. After all, eavesdropping equipment is designed to ensure
that those under surveillance do not know about it.
To enhance Title III’s deterrent effect, Congress included a provision
covering those involved in the manufacture, sale, and advertisement of covert
surveillance devices. The idea was to “dry up the source of equipment highly
useful for surveillance.” 95 Section 2512 made it a crime to intentionally
manufacture, sell, or advertise a device knowing or having reason to know that
its design renders it “primarily useful” for the surreptitious interception of
wire, oral, or electronic communications. 96 Defendants face fines of not more
than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than five years or both.
88 Dempsey, supra note, at 71. See Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act,
162 U. PA. L. REV. 373, 379 (2014) (discussing provisions of Title III that provide exceptions
when wiretapping is legal without a court order and set forth procedures for lawful
interception pursuant to a court order).
89 Kerr, supra note, at 380.
90 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3), (5) (2012).
91 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5).
92 Dempsey, supra note, at 70.
93 For a thoughtful exploration of the significance of Title III and Katz, see Susan Freiwald, A
First Principles Approach of Communications’ Privacy, 2007 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. (2007).
94 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012). Most states follow this approach, though 12 states criminalize the
interception of electronic communications unless both parties to the communication consent to
the interception. Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 Ill. L. Rev. 1417,
1485 (2009).
95 S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2183 (1968).
96 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b) (2012).
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Section 2512 covers a “narrow category of devices whose principal use is
likely to be for wiretapping or eavesdropping.” 97 A surveillance device must be
“sufficiently invasive or devious in purpose to warrant criminal prosecution.” 98
The inquiry focuses on the degree to which a device’s components render it
useful for the secret interception of communications. 99 Disclaimers that
customers should be advised of the law do not immunize defendants from
conviction. 100 A defendant cannot avoid penalties under Section 2512 “by
surrounding himself with disclaimers and closing his eyes to the [surreptitious]
nature and use of the devices.” 101
Section 2512’s safe harbor exempts entities that supply surveillance
equipment to government agencies or communication providers. 102 For
instance, the manufacture of network packet sniffers seemingly falls outside of
Section 2512 because the device helps broadband providers detect network
intrusion attempts, identify misuse by internal and external users, monitor
network usage, and filter suspect content from network traffic. The provision of
packet sniffers does not run afoul of the law because it is used in the normal
course of a communication provider’s business.
Twenty-five states and the District of Columbia have adopted similar
statutes. 103 Most state laws track the exact language of Section 2512, including
its safe harbor provisions. Pennsylvania makes it a felony to intentionally
United States v. Shriver, 989 F.2d 898, 906 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting 1968 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News at 2112, 2183-84). Although Title III did not provide examples of devices on
lawmakers’ minds, the Senate Report accompanying the statute included a non-exhaustive list
of banned devices like the martini olive transmitter, spike mike, and microphones hidden in
pens and calculators. 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 2112, 2184.
98 Shriver, 989 F.2d at 906.
99 United States v. Shriver, 989 F.2d 898, 906 (7th Cir. 1992). That inquiry focuses on the
“particular characteristics of the device at issue.” Id. Expert testimony may be useful to prove
that a device is primarily designed for stealth use. United States v. Wynn, 633 F. Supp. 595, 602
(C.D. Ill. 1986).
100 United States v. Brio, 143 F.3d 1421, 1429 (11th Cir. 1998).
101 United States v. Wynn, 633 F. Supp. 595, 606 (C.D. Ill. 1986).
102
18 U.S.C. § 2512(2)(a)(b) (2012).
103
ALA. CODE § 13A-11-34; CAL. PENAL CODE § 635 (West); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-302
(West); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-41s (West); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2403 (West); D.C.
CODE § 23-543. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.04 (West); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-63 (West); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 803-43 (West); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6703 (West); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 15:1304; ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 710; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-403 (West); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 750.539f (West); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626A.03 (West); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:3;
N.J.S.A. § 2A:156A–5; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-288 (West); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-1503 (West); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 176.3 (West); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5705 (West); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-35-24 (West); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-30-55; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 16.02
(West); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23a-5 (West); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1D-4 (West).
97
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manufacture, sell, distribute, or advertise an “electronic, mechanical or other
device, knowing or having reason to know that the design of such device
renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of a
wire, electronic or oral communication.” 104 Maine’s statute is broader: it
proscribes the sale of “any device, contrivance, machine or apparatus designed
or commonly used for the interception of wire or oral communications.” 105
As technology has evolved, gaps in the law have become apparent.
Federal and state laws do not cover surveillance tools devoted to the secret
collection of location data. As U.S. Senator Al Franken has explained and has
worked to change, “there is no federal law banning the secret collection of
location data.” 106 At the state level, the rare exception is section 637.7 of the
California Penal Code, which states that “[n]o person or entity in this state shall
use an electronic tracking device to determine the location or movement of a
person.” 107 This provision (and the few others like it) likely has no application
to cyber stalking apps because it only covers electronic tracking devices
“attached” to a vehicle or movable thing. 108
We have seen some prosecutions of individuals responsible for the
production of devices primarily designed to facilitate the stealth interception of
communications. At the federal level, spy stores have been convicted of selling
voice recorders and transmitters hidden in pens, light bulbs, wall plugs, and
calculators. 109 Defendants have been imprisoned for selling wireless telephone
microphones whose small size made them easy to hide and whose design
permitted remote, clandestine monitoring. 110
Nonetheless, prosecutions remain extremely rare. Despite the increasing
prevalence of spyware, federal prosecutors have only brought a handful of
cases. 111 In 2005, a San Diego student, Carlos Perez-Melara, was indicted for
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5705 (West).
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 710.
106 Press Release, Sen. Al Franken, After Pressure from Senator Franken, Federal Officials Take
Action Against Dangerous “Stalking Apps” (Sept. 30, 2014),
http://www.franken.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=2960.
107
CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.7 (West); Del. Code Ann. Title 11, section 1335(a)(8); Tex. Penal Code
Ann. 16.06.
108 CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.7 (West).
109 United States v. Brio, 143 F.3d 1421, 1430 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Spy Factory, Inc.,
951 F. Supp. 450, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
110 United States v. Wynn, 633 F. Supp. 595, 603 (C.D. Ill. 1986).
111 The first case involving spyware was brought in 1997 against Spy Shops International. The
United States Attorney’s Office in Miami, with Assistant U.S. Attorney Robert Mosbacher in the
lead, pursued 2512 charges against the defendant for importing and selling spyware designed
to be primarily used to intercept electronic communications surreptitiously. I am grateful to
Robert Mosbacher for talking to me about the case.
104
105
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manufacturing, selling, and advertising spyware programs called “EmailPI”
and “Lover Spy.” 112 The program was designed to “catch a cheating lover.” It
sent victims an electronic greeting card that, once opened, would secretly
install a keystroke logger and data-gleaning software. The program captured
email, passwords, documents, and browser histories and sent reports of them
to users on a regular basis. Users could take control of the watched person’s
computer, including turning on the webcam and deleting or altering files. 113
The case, however, fizzled after the defendant fled the country.
Nearly ten years elapsed before federal prosecutors charged another
spyware producer under Section 2512. In September 2014, federal prosecutors
brought Section 2512 charges against StealthGenie’s CEO Hammad Akbar. 114
StealthGenie’s spyware app secretly intercepted communications to and from
mobile phones. 115 The company’s marketing material explained that its app is
“100% undetectable” and “runs in the background of the mobile phone without
disturbing any of the other functions running.” 116 StealthGenie promised to
help subscribers “uncover the truth” by “secretly monitoring all the activities of
your loved one or employee, and let you know their location at all times.” 117
The federal indictment alleged that the app’s target population was “spousal
cheat: Husband/Wife of boyfriend/girlfriend suspecting their other half of
cheating or any other suspicious behavior or if they just want to monitor
them.” 118 A federal judge issued a temporary restraining order authorizing the
FBI to disable the site hosting StealthGenie. 119
Law enforcement has been slow to prosecute the distributors of spyware
despite their life-threatening implications and illegal nature. 120 At the state
level, criminal law’s enforcement has been virtually nonexistent.121 Why so few
state and federal prosecutions?

China Martens, ‘Loverspy’ Creator Indicted, On the Run, IDG NEWS SERVICE (Aug. 29, 2005).
Martens, supra note.
114 Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Pakistani Man Indicted for Selling
StealthGenie Spyware App (Sept. 29, 2014).
115 Id. Federal prosecutors in the Eastern District of Virginia brought the case because
StealthGenie is hosted at a data center in Ashburn, Virginia. Id.
116 Id.
117 StealthGenie Official, supra note.
118 Zetter, supra note.
119 FBI Arrests StealthGenie Mobile Spyware App Maker, Disables Website, FBI NEWS BLOG (Sept. 20,
2014), http://www.fbi.gov/news/news_blog/fbi-arrests-stealthgenie-spyware-app-makerdisables-site.
120 Zetter, supra note.
121 My research assistants and I searched Westlaw and Lexis for state law cases involving the
prosecution of providers of stealth spying equipment and could not find any.
112
113
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One reason for the low number of prosecutions may be the difficulty in
proving that a device is primarily designed for the secret interception of
electronic communications. 122 Esteemed privacy advocate James Dempsey
blames the small number of Section 2512 prosecutions on the fact that it is hard
to demonstrate that equipment is “primarily” designed for stealth interception
of communications. 123
Another reason is that law enforcement generally devotes too few
resources to combating domestic violence and stalking. State and local police
departments receive little training about relevant laws and technologies. Law
enforcement’s lackluster response is also related to the view that cyber stalking
is no big deal. 124 Law enforcement officers often advise victims that they have
more important matters to address, such as murder and child porn, and lack
the resources for cyber stalking cases. 125
Additional problems include the fact that cyber stalking and domestic
abuse are under-reported. Because victims do not think that law enforcement
will take their complaints seriously, they often do not seek out its help. 126 There
is also a significant lack of digital forensic resources resulting in proof problems
for prosecutors. Lastly, as has long been true, society has difficulty in
quantifying the harm caused by privacy violations, which leads to failure by
law enforcement to prioritize this type of enforcement.
We cannot be sure of the precise reasons for the under-enforcement of
criminal law. But we can confidently say that criminal law has been rarely used
to punish the production of equipment that has little use beyond the stealth
interception of communications data.
C. Consumer Protection Laws
Stalking app producers may be running afoul of consumer protection
statutes. Under Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the FTC can
seek injunctive or other equitable relief against companies engaging in unfair
Dempsey, supra note, at 111.
Dempsey, supra note, at 111.
124
CITRON, supra note, at 85.
125 Amanda Hess, A Former FBI Agent on Why It’s So Hard to Prosecute Gamergate Trolls, SLATE
(Oct. 17, 1014),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2014/10/17/gamergate_threats_why_it_s_so_hard_t
o_prosecute_the_people_targeting_zoe.html. Although law enforcement agencies often dismiss
cyber stalking victims because they claim they are too busy investigating terrorism or murder,
FBI statistics tell another story. From 2010-2013, the top three crimes pursued by the FBI
involved aggravated assault, drug crimes, and larceny theft.
126 C ITRON , supra note, at 183-84.
122
123
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or deceptive acts or practices. Acts are considered unfair if they cause or are
likely to cause substantial injury that consumers cannot reasonably avoid and
their countervailing benefits to consumers or competition does not outweigh
the costs. 127
Under its Section 5(a) authority, the FTC has brought charges against
spyware and mobile apps engaged in the surreptitious collection of
communications data. In 2012, the FTC alleged that DesignerWare LLC, a
company providing spyware to rent-to-own computer providers, engaged in
unfair and deceptive practices. The company’s software secretly logged a
computer user’s keystrokes, photographed anyone in view of the computer’s
webcam, and tracked the computer’s geolocation. 128 In 2013, Designerware
entered into a consent decree with the FTC, agreeing not to gather data from
computers without giving clear and prominent notice of such tracking at the
time the computer is rented and without obtaining affirmative express
consent. 129
Similarly, in 2008, the FTC filed a suit against CyberSpy Software, which
sold a keylogger program called RemoteSpy. 130 RemoteSpy could be disguised
as an innocuous attachment to an email. Once an email recipient clicked on the
attachment, the program would be installed onto the recipient’s computer. The
spyware generated records of all of the keystrokes typed, images captured,
passwords provided, and sites visited on the infected computers. To access the
information intercepted and gathered by the spyware, users would log into a
site maintained by the defendants. 131 CyberSpy Software urged its users to
employ stealth email services to send the software so recipients could not
identify them. 132
In 2010, the defendants entered into a consent decree with the FTC, in
which they agreed to refrain from promoting, selling, or distributing software
127

15 U.S.C. § 43(n) (2012).

128

https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/04/130415designerwarecm
pt.pdf
129

https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/04/130415designerwaredo.
pdf.
130 Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, Federal Trade Commission
v. CyberSpy Software, LLC, and Tracer R. Spence, No. 08-CV-01872 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 5, 2008).
131 Press Release, Federal Trade Comm’n, Spyware Seller Settles FTC Charges; Order Bars
Marketing of Keylogger Spyware for Illegal Uses (June 2, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2010/06/spyware-seller-settles-ftc-charges-order-bars-marketingkeylogger.
132 Preliminary Injunctive Order, Federal Trade Commission v. CyberSpy Software LLC, and
Tracer R. Spence, No. 08-CV-01872 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2008).
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that would be installed on computers without the knowledge and express
consent of the computers’ owners. 133 The defendants agreed to install a popup
notice that clearly and prominently disclosed the function of the software to
computer owners. 134 They also pledged to retain records about their customers,
including names, addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, payments, and
items purchased. 135
Beyond spyware, the FTC has signaled that apps collecting geolocation
data owe special duties to their users. 136 The FTC brought an action against a
flashlight app developer for failing to notify users before the app was
downloaded that their geolocation information would be collected and shared
with third parties. The resulting consent decree required the defendant to
provide a separate notice and opt-in consent to consumers before collecting
geolocation information. The lesson to providers is that consumers must be
clearly notified about the collection and sharing of geolocation data, the
reasons for the collection and sharing, and the identity of third parties with
whom geolocation data will be shared.
As Daniel Solove and Woodrow Hartzog have powerfully argued, the
FTC has laid down common law principles for the protection of consumer
privacy.137 FTC settlements in cases involving Designerware LLC, CyberSpy
Software, 138 Aaron’s Rental, 139 and Android Flashlight app 140 make clear the
agency’s view that spyware and mobile apps collecting communications and
geolocation data should not operate without express consumer consent. The
FTC, however, can take us only so far given its limited resources and power.

Stipulated Final Order for Permanent Injunction, Federal Trade Commission v. CyberSpy
Software LLC, and Tracer R. Spence, No. 08-CV-01872 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2010).
134 Id.
135 Stipulated Final Order for Permanent Injunction, Federal Trade Commission v. CyberSpy
Software LLC, and Tracer R. Spence, No. 08-CV-01872 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2010).
136 See Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015).
137 Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014).
138 Stipulated Final Order for Permanent Injunction, Federal Trade Commission v. CyberSpy
Software LLC, and Tracer R. Spence, No. 08-CV-01872 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2010).
139 Press Release, Federal Trade Comm’n, Aaron’s Rent-to-Own Chain Settles FTC Charges that
It Enabled Computer Spying by Franchisees (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2013/10/aarons-rent-own-chain-settles-ftc-charges-it-enabledcomputer.
140 Press Release, Federal Trade Comm’n, Android Flashlight App Developer Settles FTC
Charges It Deceived Consumer (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2013/12/android-flashlight-app-developer-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived.
133
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The agency cannot issue fines under Section 5. 141 Only if companies violate
settlement orders can the FTC pursue them for monetary penalties. 142
What about state Attorneys General and state consumer protection
agencies? Under state unfair consumer practice acts (often called little-FTC
Acts), Attorneys General can seek civil penalties as well as injunctive relief
against spyware app providers’ unfair and deceptive consumer practices.
Unfortunately, far too little attention has been paid to the issue on the state
level.
There are important exceptions. The Attorney General of California
Kamala Harris, for instance, has been an aggressive advocate for online
privacy. 143 She issued the guidance document “Privacy on the Go” with
recommendations for mobile apps to safeguard consumer privacy. 144 A
prominent goal of the AG’s study was the minimization of consumer surprise.
AG Harris’s report called upon mobile app providers to ensure just-in-time
notice about the collection of personal information to reduce the unexpected
collection of consumer data. 145 In 2012, AG Harris created a privacy
enforcement task force, which has filed enforcement actions against mobile app
developers to inform users what personal information they were collecting. 146
California’s eCrime Unit has pursued computer intrusion criminal
prosecutions. 147

DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 854 (5th ed. 2014).
If companies violate the terms of a final order issued by the FTC, then they could be liable
for penalties up to $16,000 per violation. Section 5(l) of the FTC Act.
143 Jason M. Crawford, State AGs and Online Privacy: Trends We Saw in 2013, LAW 360 (Dec. 6,
2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/493366/state-ags-and-online-privacy-trends-we-sawin-2013; Divonne Smoyer & Aaron Lancaster, State AGs: The Most Important Regulators in the
US?, THE PRIVACY ADVISOR (Nov. 26, 2013), https://privacyassociation.org/news/a/state-agsthe-most-important-regulators-in-the-us/. Of late, state Attorneys General have made
consumer privacy a priority including Connecticut, Maryland, Texas, New York, and others.
141
142

KAMALA D. HARRIS, PRIVACY ON THE GO: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE MOBILE
ECOSYSTEM (Jan. 2013), available at
http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/privacy_on_the_go.pdf.
145 Id.
144

Press Release, California Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Notifies
Mobile App Developers of Non-Compliance with California Privacy Law (Oct. 30, 2012),
https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-notifies-mobileapp-developers-non-compliance.
147 For instance, California’s Department of Justice prosecuted George Bronk for hacking into
women’s email and Facebook accounts to steal their nude photos. Bronk sent the nude photos
to the women’s email contacts. Nina Mandell, Facebook Stalker Turned Email Hacker Sentenced to
Four Years in Prison: Sent Nude Photos of Victims, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 24, 2011),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/facebook-stalker-years-prison-article-1.156894.
146
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Much more should be done on the state level to combat stalking apps
and their ilk.
III. NEXT STEPS
This Part lays out a plan of action. The first step focuses on potential
legal reform. The second sketches out possibilities to enhance the enforcement
of existing laws. The last calls for private efforts to combat cyber stalking apps.
A. Updating the Law
Let’s consider potential criminal law reforms. In 2014, Senator Al
Franken proposed the Location Privacy Protection Act (LPPA). The impetus
behind the bill was the rise of cyber stalking apps and their enablement of
domestic violence and stalking. A section of the LPPA would extend Section
2512’s coverage to devices that collect geolocation information.148 Congress and
state lawmakers should adopt this proposal. National domestic violence
groups, consumer advocacy groups, the FTC, and the Department of Justice
support the extension of Section 2512 to geolocation data, and for good reason
given the risks accompanying the disclosure of location data.149
Section 2512 and similar state laws also should be broadened to cover
devices whose design renders them “useful” for secret interception and
collection of electronic, wire, and oral communications and geolocation data.
The more demanding “primarily useful” standard should be jettisoned as it
erects an unnecessary barrier to criminal penalties. 150 Prosecutors may be
reluctant to pursue Section 2512 charges because it is hard to prove that their
design renders them “primarily useful” for secret surveillance. The “primarily
useful” standard allows defendants to point to a device’s legitimate uses (e.g.,
parents keeping tabs on their children) as cover for its illegitimate ones. 151 This
148 Location Privacy Protection Act of 2014, S. 2171, 113th Cong. § 6 (2014) (prohibiting
development and distribution of stalking apps).
149 Location Privacy Protection Act of 2014: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Privacy, Technology and
the Law of the S. Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (June 4, 2014) (Statements of Bea Hanson,
Principal Deputy Dir., Department of Justice Office on Violence Against Women, and Jessica
Rich, Dir., FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection); Press Release, Senator Franken’s ‘Stalking
Apps’ Bill One Step Closer to Becoming Law (Dec. 13, 2012),
https://www.franken.senate.gov/?p=hot_topic&id=2254.
150 Dempsey, supra note, at 111.
151 As Senator Franken explained at the Senate Privacy, Technology, and Law subcommittee
hearing on the proposed Location Privacy Protection Act, a stalking ware provider focused its
advertising on people who suspected their intimates of cheating. Once it became clear that his
office was investigating stalking apps, the company changed its advertising to focus on uses by
employers and parents. http://www.c-span.org/video/?319758-1/privacy-location-stalkingapps.
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tough standard has permitted spying businesses to flourish even if they market
their spying software as “100% undetectable.”
Rather than the “primarily userful” standard, federal and state
wiretapping statutes should cover the provision of devices “designed for” the
stealth interception and collection of communications and geolocation data.
What makes a device highly likely to invade privacy and enable stalking is its
covert nature. We do not need proof that a tool’s design renders it “primarily
useful” for stealth interception and collection to punish its provision. That a
tool is designed to accomplish surveillance in an undetectable manner is what
makes it illegitimate. 152 It should be illegal to manufacture, sell, or advertise
software designed to covertly intercept communications and location data.
Would eliminating the “primarily useful” requirement deter the
production of devices with legitimate uses? Hardly. As NNEDV’s Cindy
Southworth has argued, apps engaged in legitimate monitoring—such as the
parent worried about a child’s location or the employer concerned about an
employee’s misuse of her phone—need not disguise their presence. 153 A parent
can locate a child if the cell phone’s app database shows that the location app is
running. The same is true for employers who want to check on employees’
activities during work hours.
Also, apps that do not hide their presence would help ensure that
employers themselves do not run afoul of wiretapping laws. Suppose that an
employer owns the cell phones that it provides to employees. The employer
loads spyware apps on the phones. In states with two-party consent wiretap
laws, the employer is at risk for prosecution if employees using the phones talk
to others on the phone without getting their consent to being monitored. 154

152 See Paul Ohm, The Myth of the Superuser: Fear, Risk, and Harm Online, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1327, 1401 (2008) (comparing the DMCA to Section 2512 and arguing that “[i]f one
characteristic of a tool is especially pernicious and unlikely to be useful for widespread,
legitimate use, a narrow law can be written criminalizing the creation or distribution of that
tool”).
153 Grant Gross, Mobile Spying Apps Fuel Domestic Violence, U.S. Senator Says, PC WORLD (June 4,
2014),
http://www.pcworld.idg.com.au/article/546855/mobile_spying_apps_fuel_domestic_violenc
e_us_senator_says/.
154 An employer’s use of spyware would be legitimate under federal and most state
wiretapping laws if the employer monitored the employee’s phone with the express or implied
consent of the employee. Such monitoring would be illegal in the twelve states that require all
parties to a communication to consent to the interception. Ohm, supra note, at 1485. The states
that require the consent of all parties to a communication are California, Connecticut, Florida,
Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
Pennsylvania, and Washington. Id. at 1486 n. 379.
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State lawmakers should consider adopting long-arm statutes that would
enable courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over foreign app developers. One
approach is to adopt a long-arm provision that permits prosecutors to pursue
defendants whose software has harmed its citizens or whose services host data
in the state. 155
If lawmakers decline to adopt criminal law reforms, lawmakers could
consider imposing record-keeping requirements for spyware providers that
know or have reason to know are used for secret surveillance. Sellers would be
required to keep records of purchases, including detailed information about
their users. We saw record-keeping requirements in the FTC’s consent decree
in the CyberSpy case. The FTC and state agencies should be given oversight
over record-keeping requirements and the power to seek civil penalties against
violators. Criminal penalties could follow if record-keeping requirements are
not followed. 156
Record-keeping requirements could help deter criminal activity. Because
providers would have to keep records about their customers, their records
would put them on notice that their equipment is primarily used for secret
spying. Providers might adopt measures—such as having icons signaling the
presence of apps—to immunize themselves from criminal liability. Individual
perpetrators might think better of using software to spy on intimates because
the threat of criminal penalty might seem real. Having to provide detailed
information to providers about their identities might deter some wrongdoing.
Another potential reform is to give the FTC the power to pursue civil
penalties against entities whose devices are designed to intercept private
communications and location data without detection. In testifying in support of
Senator Franken’s Location Privacy Protection Act of 2014, the FTC’s Chief of
the Bureau of Consumer Protection pressed the bill’s supporters to give the
FTC the ability to enforce the civil penalty provision of the bill. 157 Civil
penalties could serve as a potent deterrent to stalking app producers. 158
Thanks to Venus Johnson and Jeff Rabkin for talking to me about jurisdictional issues and
potential reform efforts in California. At the federal level, prosecutors asserted their jurisdiction
over the StealthGenie CEO on the company’s hosting of data in Virginia.
156 A similar regulatory scheme applies to the pornography industry under 18 U.S.C. 2257.
157 Location Privacy Protection Act of 2014: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Privacy, Technology and
the Law of the S. Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (June 4, 2014) (Statement of Jessica Rich, Dir., FTC
Bureau of Consumer Protection).
158 Legislative permission would lend democratic imprimatur to agency action. The FTC has
faced criticism about its enforcement efforts under Section 5(a) on the grounds that the unfair
and deceptive practices statutory language fails to provide adequate notice to defendants of
what constitutes appropriate behavior. The Federal Trade Commission and its Section 5 Authority:
Prosecutor, Judge, and Jury: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform,
155
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What about private rights of action? Under current law, parties who
know that they have been spied upon likely cannot sue the companies that
enable the privacy invasions. 159 A main barrier to recovery in common law tort
cases is courts’ refusal to recognize privacy harms as justiciable or cognizable in
the absence of financial harm. 160 State and federal lawmakers could overcome
these problems by recognizing a statutory private right of action against
entities providing, selling, and advertising devices designed to secretly
intercept communications and location data.
What about concerns that legal reform will impede innovation? The
legal agenda proposed here is not designed to impede legitimate business
practices. In our digital age, personal data is routinely collected, processed, and
shared. Behavioral advertisers personalize ads based on online browsing habits.
Social networks amass reservoirs of personal data including user-provided
location information and message histories. These entities engage in these
practices for commercial purposes, whether to sell advertising or to enhance
user experiences, not for illegal ends. The FTC common law has set forth basic
fair information practice principles, including notice and transparency for the
collection, use, and sharing of consumer data. Such practices can and should
proceed if consumers are given clear and prominent notice of these practices.
These commercial enterprises have little in common with businesses that
enable domestic abusers to spy on another person’s private communications
and location without detection. They sell tools that enable the continuous and
secret tracking of a person’s communications and location by private spies.
Spying Incorporated is distinct from commercial practices with beneficial,
legitimate uses, and so in turn are the civil and criminal penalties that attach to
it.
B. Enforcement Efforts
Without question, a legal agenda must be paired with support for law
enforcement. Law enforcement needs access to digital forensic expertise and
training about existing law. Police officers need to better understand the
dangers of stalking apps, investigatory techniques, and available laws.

113th Cong. (July 24, 2014) (statement of Prof. Gerard M. Stegmaier), available at
http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Stegmaier-Statement-7-24FTC.pdf.
159 Luis v. Zang, Nos. 1:11–cv–884, 1:12–cv–629 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 5, 2013), available at 2013 WL
811816 (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 2520 did not provide a private right of action for Section 2512
violations).
160
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008).
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In a world of limited resources, the difficulty is identifying additional
funding sources. It is expensive to hire digital forensics experts for each and
every local police force. One possibility is for localities to join together to
allocate money for digital forensic resources. Another is for localities to obtain
funding from the Department of Justice. Local law enforcement agencies could
share access to experts. Another potential source of funding is the monetary
penalties stemming from convictions under Section 2512 and similar state laws.
To the extent that Section 2512 and similar state laws are enforced, the fines
collected from convicted defendants could be diverted to funding digital
forensic specialists.
Another avenue to encourage enforcement is the mandatory collection of
statistics about investigations and prosecutions of Section 2512 and state laws.
Mandatory reporting rules would help shine light on what law enforcement is
and is not doing to combat cyber stalking app providers. Interested advocacy
groups could bring publicity to gaps in enforcement, garnering the interest of
elected officials including district attorneys.
C. Private Sector Solutions
To be sure, legislative reform may move slowly and the enforcement of
existing criminal law may make only small advances in the near term. Private
sector providers could help envision other solutions. Apple and Google are
moving to end-to-end encryption to deal with governmental intrusion.
Smartphone manufacturers and ISPs might adopt technologies to prevent the
installation of spyware without the consent of the device owner. There may
indeed be consumer demand for such a move. We have seen public support for
encrypted cell phones to resist the spying eyes of government. There may be
strong consumer demand for devices that are not vulnerable to spyware.
CONCLUSION
The time to strike against stalking apps and their ilk is now. With the
increasing adoption of biometric technologies, wearable monitors, and
networked home devices, our cell phones will amass an unimaginably rich
record of our lives. As spyware proliferates, stalkers, domestic abusers, and
identity thieves will have access to those intimate reservoirs of our personal
data. The consequences will be grave. We need to confront the issue with all
potential tools, including criminal and civil penalties. The private sector can
play its role as well, for the good of consumers and society.
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